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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ARREST WITHOUT
A WARRANT *
T HE law of arrest consists of rules dealing principally with:
(i) definitions of arrest; (2) limitations upon the right to
arrest, varying with (a) the individual making the arrest (police
officer or private person), (b) the time of arrest in relation to the
type of offense, (c) whether the arrest is with or without a war-
rant; (3) the issuance of warrants; (4) duties of the officer or
private person after he makes the arrest; and (5) the effects of
(a) illegal arrest, and of (b) violation of duties after arrest.
The rules relating to arrest with a warrant prescribe such tech-
nical conditions as that the court issuing the warrant must have
jurisdiction, and that the warrant must not reveal upon its face
any defect so serious as to make it "void ". Lack of jurisdic-
tion is rare. And, with the standardization of legal forms, seri-
ously defective warrants have also become infrequent. The usual
remedies here lie against the complainant who set the machinery
of criminal prosecution into motion rather than against the per-
son making the arrest. Accordingly, it is arrest without a war-
rant that presents the more acute problems. Such arrest affects
obligations and activities of almost all persons, lay and official.
It requires the maximum exercise of discretion, and hence repre-
sents the maximum grant of right.
The statement of the general rules on arrest without a warrant,
found in Halsbury's Laws of England,' may be condensed thus:
For a misdemeanor, neither an officer nor a private person may
arrest. For a breach of the peace, an officer or a private person
may arrest to prevent or terminate the crime, or immediately
after its commission. For treason or felony, an officer may arrest
if he has reasonable belief both in the commission of the crime
and in the guilt of the arrestee; a private person may arrest if
* For their very kind and valuable assistance, the writer is obliged to Professor
Sam B. Warner, Dean Pound, and Dr. Sheldon Glueck.
I Volume 9 (2d ed. 1933) 84-98. For a summary, see Wilgus, Arrest Without a
Warrant (1924) 22 MICH. L. Rav. 673-74.
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the crime has actually been committed, and if he has reasonable
belief in the guilt of the arrestee. Thus only in arrest for felony
where no felony has been committed does the right of a private
person fall short of that of a police officer. The development of
this differentiation between lay and official right is of primary
importance in any study of the legal and social aspects of arrest.
HISTORY OF THE LEGAL DOCTRINE
Long and frequent reiteration by commentators, lawyers, and
judges of this difference between private and official right as the
"common law rule" has tended to obscure its origin. The con-
fusion conceals the social significance of the law of arrest.
Analysis of the professional literature of the English criminal
law is illuminating. So informed a scholar as Stephen tells us
that" The result of his [Hale's] inquiry may be stated thus: ...
3. Any constable may arrest any person whom he suspects ...
of having committed any felony, whether in fact any such felony
has been committed or not." 2 No specific reference to Hale is
given. Hale, indeed, did remark that "these officers . . .may
without any other warrant but from themselves arrest felons, and
those that are probably suspected of felonies ".1
The meaning of this statement will be clarified by prior ex-
amination of Dalton, Hale's most important immediate predeces-
sor.' After defining arrest and discussing the status and rights
of the arrestee, Dalton shifts to the rights and duties of the acting
party -the one making the arrest.5 But instead of discussing
peace officers, in the fashion of the modern treatise, he speaks of
"every private person", " every man ", " any man ". Then fol-
lows one sentence only regarding officers: "The Sherife, Bailifes,
Constables, and other the Kings Officers may arrest and imprison
offenders, in all cases where a private person may, and without any
writ or warrant." 6 A discussion of warrants, jurisdiction, duties of
2 x STEPiEx, HSTORy Or T E CPmnxNA LAW (1883) 193.
8 2 HALE, PLEAS OF T CROWN (ist Am. ed. 1847) 84-85.
4 The first edition of Dalton's work, TnE COUNTREY JuSTIcF, appeared in 1618.
Hale died in x676. His works appeared shortly thereafter.
5 See THE CouNTREY JusTICE (6th ed. 1643) Cap. 118, p. 413.
6 Id. at 416. Similarly, "The Justice of peace may arrest and imprison offenders
in all cases where a private person may." Ibid.
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officers after arrest, and imprisonment concludes Dalton's analysis.
This order of topics, in contrast to that of contemporary treatises,
this emphasis upon arrest by "every man ", this selection of the
"private person" as the standard by which the right of officers to
arrest without a warrant is measured, are distinctive and signifi-
cant. Not a word appears in Dalton recognizing any right, lay or
official, to arrest without a warrant for felony where none has been
committed.7 On the contrary, referring to " every private per-
son " - the central figure in his discussion and the standard of
right -Dalton states that he may arrest without a warrant one
"whom he knoweth or seeth to have committed a . . . felonie.
. . . Also when a felony is committed, every man may arrest sus-
picious persons that be of evill fame. . . . But for the arresting
of such suspicious persons, note, that there must bee some felony
committed indeed." 8
Hale's discussion of arrest is much more systematic and com-
plete.9 The first chapter (still the order of Dalton) deals with
arrest of felons by private persons; the second, with such arrest
by officers; the third, with arrest upon hue and cry; and the fourth,
with arrest under warrants. Again most conspicuous, because it
is completely omitted, is the case of arrest for felony where no
felony has been committed -the situation crucial in the contem-
porary problem.'" All of the situations Hale discusses (except
7 Dalton's discussion is not entirely unambiguous. Thus: "But yet for mis-
demeanors done against the Kings peace, (as for Treason, felonie, or breaking
of the peace, &c.) the offenders as well by the Common Law, as by divers statutes,
may be arrested and imprisoned, by the officers of Justice, and sometimes by
private persons, (as hereunder followeth) without either Presentment, Processe,
Precept, Warrant, or other commandment." Op. cit. supra note 5, at 414. The only
explanations for this statement, that occur to the writer, are (i) that Dalton was
here indicating what the law ought to be; or (2) that he had in mind official practice,
not yet recognized by law.
8 Id. at 414-I5 (italics supplied). Except that "Huy and cry after L S. for
felony, seemeth to be sufficient cause to arrest him, though there be no felony com-
mitted." Id. at 415. Cf. CoxE, Tum IusTrrua *1i8. Also, "Nightwalkers, being
strangers, or suspected persons, Watchmen may arrest them, and may stay them
till the morning, &c.... Yea, every man may arrest such Nightwalkers, for it
is for the good of the common wealth." DALTON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 416;
Cf. 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (ist Am. ed. 1847) "IO-O2; 2 IIAwKINS, PLEAS Or
TE CROWN (8th ed. 1824) c. 12, § i6.
9 2 PLEAS OF TEM CROWN (ist Am. ed 1847) cc. I1-13.
10 Cf. id. at 75, 91-92.
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hue and cry, and nightwalkers) presuppose the commission of a
felony.
We return to Hale's statement which alone might support
Stephen's assertion already quoted. 1 This is preceded by allega-
tions that officers "are more eminently trusted. . . . Because
they are by law punishable, if they neglect their duty ... . And
therefore it is all the reason that can be, that they should have
the greatest protection and encouragement in the due execution
of their office ".1 Clearly, official right at that time was greater
in some regard than that of private persons. But the difference
did not lie in any right to arrest without a warrant where no felony
had been committed. As to private persons, we have the signifi-
cant statement that if there has been no felony, "there can be no
ground of suspicion ".1' And as to officers, in discussing their
power to arrest in cases of "suspicion of felony ", Hale makes it
clear that "there must be a felony in fact done ,.1' The differ-
ence between private and official right lay rather in the quality of
the suspicion regarding the guilt of the arrestee. A private person
must have a reasonable suspicion of the arrestee's guilt, originating
within himself. An officer might, in addition, draw his suspicion
from the statements of other persons.' Thus two definite and
equally important elements exist: commission of a felony, and
reasonable belief that the arrestee is the guilty person. "Sus-
picion of felony ", plainly, referred only to the second element. 0
11 See p. 567, supra.
12 2 HALF, PLEAS OP THE CROWN (ist Am. ed. 1847) 84.
:L3 2 id. at 78.
14 Hale's discussion of the following situation regarding arrest by constables,
indeed, his very formulation of it, sets the matter definitely at rest: "2. What his
power is to arrest in cases of suspicion of felony .... I come to the second, namely
what if there be a felony done, (Suppose a robbery upon A.) and A. suspects B.
upon probable grounds to be the felon, and acquaints the constable with it, and
desires his aid to apprehend him. ... But there must be a felony in fact done,
and the constable must be ascertained of that, and aver it in his plea, and it is
issuable." Id. at 90-92.
5 ". . . yet such an information may carry over the suspicion even to the
constable, whereby it may become his suspicion as well as the suspicion of A."
Id. at 92 (italics supplied).
16 The following also illustrates Hale's usage of "suspicion of felony ": "Again
it seems to me, that if a person thus charged with suspicion of felony upon just
grounds of suspicion, and where a felony is actually committed. . . 2 Ibid.
(italics supplied).
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With Hawkins, writing in 1716, comes greater emphasis upon
the status of officers.17 There is a bare reference to the problem
"where no treason or felony at all hath been committed, or dan-
gerous wound given."'" But he suggests no modification of the
rules regarding the right to arrest, and merely notes as exceptions
the traditional cases of suspicious persons, notorious cheats, and
hue and cry. 9
Blackstone writes that "... in case of felony actually com-
mitted, or a dangerous wounding whereby felony is like to ensue,
he [a constable] may upon probable suspicion arrest the felon." 20
And on the page immediately following he states: "Upon prob-
able suspicion also a private person may arrest the felon .... "
Thus, as late as 1765 the distinction between lay and official right
to arrest where no felony has been committed is apparently not
even hinted at.
We are able to trace definitely in the cases the origin of the
rule which augmented official right. Samuel v. Payne 22 is the pivot
upon which the legal cycle turns. A private individual charged
Samuel with having stolen some laces. A warrant to search the
latter's house (but none to arrest him) was granted; search was
made, but the goods were not found. Nevertheless, the com-
plainant, Constable Payne, and the latter's assistant arrested the
plaintiff - on a Saturday. No alderman was sitting and the
plaintiff was detained until Monday, when he was examined and
-discharged. He sued for trespass and false imprisonment. So
clearly does the fact that the complainant made a charge form
the basis of the decision in favor of the officers that it is difficult
to explain the general misinterpretation of the case. And, al-
though subsequent judges and commentators have assumed that
no felony had been committed, there was, in fact, no finding one
way or the other. Indeed, it seems highly probable that a felony
127 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF T= CROWN (8th ed. 1824) C. 12, § 20; C. 13, §§ 1, 7.
18 Id. c. 12, § 16, at iig.
19 See id. c. 12, §§ I6, 20. Cf. Hawkins' refutation of an argument made" in old
books ", that even in hue and cry, arrest for felony is illegal unless a felony has
been committed. Id. c. 12, § 16, at rig.
2D 4 BL. CoMM. *292 (italics supplied).
21 Id. at *293.
22 x Doug. 359 (K. B. 178o).
IVol. 49
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had been committed. The holding was simply that " the charge
was a sufficient justification to the constable and his assistants ".2
The other important departure is the apparent entire abandon-
ment of the requirement of reasonable suspicion, insisted upon by
Hale.2 4 Lord Mansfield held that "it would be most mischievous
that the officer should be bound first to try, and at his peril ex-
ercise his judgment on the truth [reasonableness] of the charge"
- a proposition which apparently gave carte blanche to an official
to whom a charge had been made.
Ledwith v. Catchpole,25 decided three years later, further ex-
tended official right by judicial approval of an apparently existing
practice of arrest by officers upon information placed before them.
Smith, whose merchandise had been stolen, brought to the defend-
ant, a marshalman of London, one Stevens, who said that the plain-
tiff had twice been at the coach which contained the merchandise.
Smith and the defendant officer interrogated the plaintiff, but
neither Smith nor any one else charged him with the theft. The
defendant arrested the plaintiff without a warrant. Next day the
sitting alderman discharged the plaintiff, who then brought tres-
pass and false imprisonment and secured a verdict for £20. On
motion for new trial, however, the verdict was set aside.
The clash of judicial views incident to this reveals most in-
terestingly the difference between emphasis upon rules and upon
the social problem. Buller, J., insisted that there " must be a
reasonable ground of suspicion in his own mind and within his
own knowledge, and not merely the information of others ,,.2' To
which Lord Mansfield replied (note his eye to the practice):
"How are felons in general taken up? From descriptions of them
23 Ibid. Some precedent was afforded by Ward's Case, Clayt. 44, pl. 76 (N. P.
x636), although it was there assumed that a felony had been committed. Even
though the constable "himself found no cause of suspicion upon his search ", the
arrest was held legal "because the party whose goods were gone, did charge the
Plaintiff to have taken them, and to have them ". But Samuel v. Payne was more
fully reported; it was decided by Lord Mansfield; and the date was 1780-all im-
portant factors in determining why it should be cited as authority for subsequent
decisions.
24 See p. 569, supra. With which compare the early rule that "none can arrest
the party suspected by the command of him who hath the suspicion; and with this
agrees the book in 2 H. 7. ig, 16 ". Ashley's Case, 12 Co. *90, *92 (i6rx).
25 Cald. 291 (K. B. X783).
26 Id. at 293.
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circulated in handbills. The defendant here might be induced to
suspect from what had been laid before him. . . . It is of great
consequence to the police of the country." 27 Willes, J., concurred.
It is possible that Buller was unaware of the practice of officers'
arresting on information, which had in effect been approved a
century before by Hale.2" But it is more likely that he was here
unwilling to extend the legal doctrine to include the exercise by
peace officers of a function which he regarded as judicial.
Here there was a felony committed, or so it was assumed; and
arrest upon information was sanctioned. As to the requirement
of reasonable suspicion, the opinions are ambiguous. Lord Mans-
field at first applied bona fides as the only limitation; later,
"probable cause ". Willes, J., did not generalize, but stated that
there were "strong circumstances of suspicion ".
The charge in Samuel v. Payne, and the arrest upon information
coupled with an actual felony in Ledwith v. Catchpole, form the
bases for these extensions of official right in 178o and 1783. In
the former case, probable cause was apparently unnecessary; in
the latter, the indications point to retention of the requirement.
But neither case is representative of the broad rule so long alleged
to have been "the common law ", namely, that an officer might
without a warrant arrest for felony, even though no felony had in
fact been committed. 8
In the early nineteenth century comes a series of cases which,
in the course of 2 5 years, brought to fruition the doctrines ex-
pressed in these two decisions. In White v. Taylor,"0 the plaintiff
hired a coach driven by one Simcoe. Dissatisfied with the driving,
he picked up Simcoe's number and got out of the coach in order
to report him. Simcoe then charged the plaintiff before Constable
Taylor with the theft of his number. The plaintiff was arrested
27 Cald. at 293-95.
2 See p. 569, supra.
29 In x788, in Williams v. Dawson, a rnsi prius case, Buller, J., held: "if a peace
officer, of his own head, takes a person into custody on suspicion, he must prove
that there was such a crime committed; but that if he receives a person into custody,
on a charge preferred by another of felony or breach of the peace, there he is to be
considered as a mere conduit; and if no felony or breach of the peace was committed,
the person who preferred the charge alone is answerable." Quoted in Hobbs v.
Branscomb, 3 Camp. 420, 421 (K. B. 1813).
8o 4 Esp. 8o (K. B. i8oI).
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by Taylor, but was subsequently discharged. He brought action
for trespass and false imprisonment. Le Blanc, J., applied Samuel
v. Payne to the fullest extent, rejecting Erskine's argument of
lack of probable cause as proof of mala fides in the officer. " If
he pleases ", he may use his judgment in the matter. But the rules
require only a charge of felony.
In i8io came Lawrence v. Hedger.2 The plaintiff, carrying a
bundle in London at ten o'clock in the evening, was arrested by
the defendant watchman. Next morning the plaintiff was dis-
charged by the sitting alderman, his identity having been estab-
lished. In directing a verdict for the defendant, Mansfield, C. J.,
held that "any watchman might detain the plaintiff, and carry
him to a constable ". Not only ancient statutes but also ancient
practices supported such arrests in the night. But the opinion of
Chambre, J., is noteworthy as showing that the earlier require-
ment of a charge of a felony had already been entirely forgotten.2
Yet Samuel v. Payne became the standard authority. Upon the
assumption that no felony had been committed there, and by dis-
regarding the insistence upon the charge to the officer, it provided
the necessary precedent.
In Hobbs v. Branscomb,"3 an attorney, who had received certain
money for his client, refused to remit, claiming a lien as security
for his fee. The irate client promptly secured his arrest by officers.
The attorney sued for damages. Verdict was directed for the of-
ficers, because they had acted upon a charge. Damages for lawyer
and against client were assessed by the jury at one shilling! "
In Isaacs v. Brand " a theft of silk had occurred. Three boys
33 3 Taunt. 13 (C. P.).
52 Id. at 16: "The case of Samuel v. Payne, Doug. 359, was an arrest even in
the day-time, which was much stronger; but in the night, when the town is to be
asleep, and it is the especial duty of these watchmen, and other officers, to guard
against malefactors, it is highly necessary that they should have such a power of
detention."
33 3 Camp. 420 (K. B. 1813).
34 In M'Cloughan v. Clayton, Holt 478 (N. P. 1816), one Riding "gave the
plaintiff in charge for a felony." The jury acquitted the officer upon instruction,
and awarded damages of one farthing against Riding. The reporter's note to the
above case illustrates the typical distortion of Samuel v. Payne in the process of
using it to expand legal doctrine. Writing of that case he states: "But there must
be a direct charge to the officer, or such a reasonable ground of suspicion before
his eyes, as may justify him in the eye of the law." Id. at 48X-82.
35 2 Stark. z67 (K. B. x817).
1936]
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were taken as suspects. One boy confessed, and claimed to have
disposed of the silk to the plaintiff. The defendant, a London
marshalman, went with the boy to the house of the plaintiff, who
denied the purchase. Later the defendant, without a warrant, ar-
rested him, but he was discharged the next day, apparently be-
cause no evidence against him was given. To the plaintiff's suit
the defendant pleaded that a felony had been committed and that
there had been the charge. But "Lord Ellenborough was of
opinion, that the declaration of such an accomplice did not justify
the officer in taking the plaintiff into custody upon a charge of re-
ceiving the stolen goods without any warrant, and without any
evidence, except the assertion of the boy . 2' ." Verdict of £5
returned for the plaintiff. On the facts, the requirements of Led-
with v. Catchpole were more than fully met, since here there was a
charge. But here, and in sharp contrast with the later case of
White v. Taylor, also there is insistence upon reasonableness of
the charge.
Symptomatic of doctrine in process of formation is the con-
tinued vacillation of the rule as to reasonable cause. In Hedges.
v. Chapman,"7 decided eight years after the Isaacs case, Best, C. J.,
held without qualification that an individual might bring a charge
only upon " reasonable ground of suspicion" ; but that as to the
officer who must arrest upon a charge, "it is his duty to act, and
not to deliberate "." That this rule was deemed to afford insuf-
ficient protection against abuse by officials is made clear by Cowles
v. Dunbar,9 decided two years later. Dunbar's house had been
broken into. He saw the plaintiff carrying a chest of drawers, and
delivered him into the custody of a constable. Inquiries were
made, and the plaintiff was released without being taken before a
magistrate. Said Abbott, C. J., in absolving the constable from
liability: "The cases of the two defendants are very distinguish-
able from each other. Callow is a constable, and if a reasonable40
So 2 Stark. at 169.
s7 2 Bing. 523 (C. P. 1825).
-8 Id. at 526.
39 2 C. & P. g65 (K. B. 1827).
40 This is the first clear and express limitation directly upon an officer acting
on a charge made to him. It will be recalled that there was a similar holding, but
without discussion, by Lord Ellenborough in Isaacs v. Brand, 2 Stark. 167 (K. B.
,817).
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charge of felony is given, he is bound to take the party into
custody." 41
The doctrinal fibres, expressed and implicit in these cases, were
gathered together in Beckwith v. Philby 42 in 1827. The plaintiff,
a blacksmith, was returning with a bridle and saddle from a mar-
ket where he had sold a pony. One Gould told Philby, the high
constable, that the plaintiff was acting suspiciously. Philby ques-
tioned the plaintiff and concluded that a horse had been or was
about to be stolen. The plaintiff was placed in the custody of a
constable, who took him to a hotel and held him there for the
night, handcuffed. Next day a magistrate examined him and, after
some investigation, discharged him. The plaintiff's suit was
finally decided in favor of the constables. Lord Tenterden, C. J.,
distinguishing the right of lay persons from that of officers, stated:
"There is this distinction between a private individual and a constable:
in order to justify the former in causing the imprisonment of a person,
he must not only make out a reasonable ground of suspicion, but he must
prove that a felony has actually been committed; whereas a constable
having reasonable ground to suspect that a felony has been committed,
is authorized to detain the party suspected until inquiry can be made by
the proper authorities." 4
Here, in 1827, for the first time 41 was a case closely representing
the ultimate doctrine that had been in process of formulation since
178o. Here, upon the facts, no felony had been committed. This
element is not found in any other of the cases (save in Lawrence v.
Hedger, where the ancient nightwalker statutes dominate) in
41 2 C. & P. at 568. Despite the court's recommendation of small damages
against the defendant, the verdict brought in was for £foo. But cf. Isaacs v. Brand,
2 Stark. 167 (K. B. T817) (alleged criminal receiver -damages, £5); Hobbs v.
Branscomb, 3 Camp. 420 (K. B. 1813) (lawyer who refused to remit-damages,
one shilling).
42 6 B. & C. 635 (K. B. 1827).
43 Id. at 638-39.
44 I have latterly found agreement with the position here taken- Darling, J.,
in King v. Metropolitan Dist. Ry., 99 L. T. R. (N.S.) 278, 280 (K. B. 1908), who
said: "So far as I know, the distinction between what a private person may do and
what a constable may do was first laid down in the case of Beckwith v. Philby ".
See, too, Cor.QuouN, POLIcE or THE MmropoLis (1796) 216; FELMIG, A Short
Treatise on the Office of Constable in ExTaAcrs Raom PENAL LAws (176i) 260-61;
HALn'Ax, Tha CosTrABrn's SuRE Gu-ma (2d ed. 179) 16.
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conjunction with an officer's arresting without a charge. The
opinions in the earlier cases contained language which, clipped
from its context, led readily, indeed necessarily, to the confident
opinion of Lord Tenterden. But there is now clear limitation
upon the officer's rights within the enlarged area of arrest without
a warrant: ... he must . . .make out a reasonable ground of
suspicion." 45
The special and enlarged right of officers is not questioned after
1827.6 No felony need in fact have been committed. No charge
45 6 B. & C. at 638.
46 To demonstrate this in brief summary: (a) In Davis v. Russell, 5 Bing.
354 (C. P. 1829), an action of trespass was brought against a high constable for
illegal arrest and false imprisonment. One H falsely accused the plaintiff of theft,
and the latter was arrested by the defendant late at night on the 27th of January,
z828. Next day an examination was held before a magistrate. The examination
was continued several times until February i6th. Finally the plaintiff was dis-
charged. The officer was held not liable. But again it was said that he could
arrest "only upon reasonable suspicion ". Id. at 365 (italics supplied).
(b) In Hogg v. Ward, 3 H. & N. 417 (Ex. 1858), the plaintiff was arrested by
the defendant, superintendent of police, for having stolen property in his possession.
Upon suit for false arrest, the defendant testified that Johnson, the owner of the
property, had insisted on his taking the plaintiff into custody, though the latter
was not present when the defendant did so. Pollock, C. B., held that ". . . in order
to justify an arrest, there must be a reasonable charge." Id. at 421. Bramwell, B.,
was more explicit: "If a person comes to a constable and says of another simpli-
citer 'I charge this man with felony,' that is a reasonable ground and the constable
ought to take the person charged into custody. But if from the circumstances it
appears to be an unfounded charge, the constable is not only not bound to act
upon it, but he is responsible for so doing." Id. at 422. In the opinion of Watson,
B., comes again the formulation of the basic police issue: ". . . it is of the utmost
importance that the police throughout the country should be supported in the exe-
cution of their duty,-indeed it is absolutely essential for the prevention of crime;
on the other hand, it is equally important that persons should not be arrested and
brought before magistrates upon frivolous or untenable charges." Id. at 423.
(c) Cf. Neville v. Kelly, 2 C. B. (N.s.) 740, 747 (1862), where Wilies, J., said:
"If the decision in Hogg v. Ward, 3 Hurlst. & N. 4,7, be correct, information alone
would not be enough; the grounds of suspicion must be such as a reasonable man
would act upon. One would have thought it enough if the policeman bona fide
believed the information to be true; but so is the decision in Hogg v. Ward."
(d) In Allen v. London & S. W. Ry., ii Cox C. C. 62i (K. B. 1870), the
plaintiff purchased a railway ticket, and became involved in a dispute with
the ticket agent as to the change given him. The agent gave the plaintiff into the
custody of a policeman, on the charge of attempting to steal money from the till,
which charge was later heard and dismissed as without foundation. The plaintiff
sued the railway company for illegal arrest and false imprisonment. Said Black-
burn, J.: "The police seem to have thought -and I am sorry to say I have seen
many cases of the kind where policemen think the same thing-that if a person
LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ARREST
of felony is necessary. Limitation upon official behavior took the
form of a standard of reasonable conduct: an officer might arrest
without a warrant only upon probable suspicion, and the placing
of a charge before him did not relieve him of the duty to act rea-
sonably under all the circumstances."
There appears never to have been any doubt, such as we have
met in the case of officers, that private persons could arrest only
upon reasonable suspicion of guilt. Even Lord Mansfield, who
seemed bent on extending the law of arrest in every direction im-
aginable, took a conservative view at this point. But it was with
regard to the requirement that a felony must have been committed
that the law of England placed the most important restrictions
upon arrests for felony by private persons. It had long been said
that a felony must have been committed. But was the fact that
any felony had been committed sufficient to support an arrest?
Or must a lay person prove that the felony for which he made the
arrest had been committed?
Not until Walters v. Smith 4 do we have a case that both in
fact and in opinion disclosed the narrow limits of the rule. The
arrestee was undoubtedly guilty of having committed a felony;
comes and says, 'I charge that man with an offence,' that he, the policeman, has
no discretion. That is not so. The police have power to arrest provided they have
reasonable ground to believe there has been a felony committed, and that the man
given into custody is the felon, and I do not deny that, as a general rule, where
a respectable person tells him so, the policeman should believe it; but they should
exercise a discretion, and see whether it is so or not." Id. at 625-26. Cf.
Le Blanc, J., in White v. Taylor, 4 Esp. 8o, 88 (K. B. i8oi): ". . . he may, if
he pleases, use his own discretion." And Best, C. J., in Hedges v. Chapman, 2 Bing.
523, 526 (C. P. 1825): ". . . it is his duty to act, and not to deliberate."
47 Including, apparently, the position and reputation of the complainant. Cf.
Cowles v. Dunbar, 2 C. & P. 56g (K. B. 1827). So, too, Blackburn, J., in Allen v.
London & S. W. Ry., ii Cox C. C. 621 (K. B. 1870).
48 11914] i K. B. 595. Without comment, Hawkins had written: "It seems
to be certain, that regularly he ought expressly to show that the very same crime for
which he made the arrest, was actually committed." 2 PLEAs oF THE CROWN (8th
ed. 1824) c. 12, at 120. In 1838 Tindal, C. J., used language of similar import
in Allen v. Wright, 8 C. & P. 522 (C. P.), and in 19o8 Darling, J., discussed the
rule with characteristic vigor: ". . . we must look a little further to see what
connection there is between the felony which we must assume to have been com-
mitted and the person to be arrested.... You must show connection .... " King
v. Metropolitan Dist. Ry., 99 L. T. R. (N.s.) 278, 280 (K. B. r9o8). For an anno-
tation to the above case, discussing the right of a private person to arrest without a
warrant, see (1918) 7 BRrTsH RuLrn o CASES 679-92.
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indeed, guilty of a felony committed against the person who ar-
rested him. Yet the judges assessed substantial damages against
the arrester, although he had acted upon reasonable suspicion.
The plaintiff had been manager of the defendant's bookstore for
nine years. In stock-taking at. various times several deficiencies
were discovered, showing that money or books or both had been
Stolen. It was clear that several felonies had been committed.
The plaintiff and his wife also operated a news-and-magazine
stand of their own. A marked book, "Traffic ", previously part
of the defendant's stock, was found there. The plaintiff was ar-
rested without a warrant. After his acquittal, he brought suit.
The court found that the defendant had reasonable cause to sus-
Pect the plaintiff of having stolen money or books other than
"Traffic ", but that the acquittal as to "Traffic" was final. Ac-
cordingly, upon the legally binding premise that the identical felony
for which the plaintiff was arrested had not been committed, sub-
stantial damages were awarded him.
Thus legal doctrine propelled first in one direction, then in an-
other, with extension here and corresponding contraction there,
suggests persistent adaptation of rules to social ends. What were
the conditions and problems that underlay this doctrine-spinning,
which in isolation seems haphazard and pointless? To give social
meaning to the rules and to the techniques of decision, it is neces-
sary to supply the life-like context of human problems, purposes,
and institutions within which the rules functioned. A synthesis
of this and of the above discussion may reveal the unity and con-
sistency of a whole process.
THE RISE OF PROFESSIONAL POLICE
We shall not tarry over the long and tortuous path marked by
many associations and agencies utilized in medieval England to
apprehend malefactors. But brevity of treatment must not ob-
scure the fact that these associations and the rules and practices
which characterized and governed them during the long centuries
from Anglo-Saxon to modern times give meaning to the entire
history. For they reveal the solid institution, the deeply ingrained
usages and habits of thought. From this long perspective it should
be possible to see our police, in certain important aspects, as a
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relatively new growth, which, by contrast with the older one, has
barely penetrated into the upper soil of traditional behavior.
Paramount is the fact that until quite modern times police duties
were the duties of every man.49 Systems of universal inter-
guardianship; " hue and cry that obliged all to cease work and
join immediately in pursuit of an offender; the liability of the hun-
dred to answer in damages for loss sustained by victims of criminal
attack; 51 and numerous lay protective associations 52- all of
these, and a web of related, interlocking activities and organiza-
tions, that enlisted the services of a great majority of the men in
the realm, provide the broad background against which the con-
temporary police force must be placed.5"
Of the hundreds of medieval enactments designed to promote
order, only one can be described here. The Statute of Winchester,
I285,"4 is the great legislative landmark which crystallized then
current rules and practices. For several centuries it afforded au-
thoritative guidance to courts and writers. It contained pro-
visions, among others, for the liability of the hundreds for rob-
beries committed within them, on failure to apprehend the
offenders; " for the appointment of specified numbers of night
watchmen for every city and borough, according to population;
49 ", 'So that every English man is a sergeant to take the thiefe, and who
sheweth negligence therein do not only incurre Evil opinion therefore, but hardly
shall escape punishment.' From 'The Commonwealth of England,' by Sir Thomas
Smith, i589 edition." Quoted by LEE, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND (igoi)
334. And recall Dalton's emphasis upon "every man" as the standard of right.
50 Cf. I PIx, HIsToRY oF C.n RE (1873) 59-60; I MAITLAND, COLLECD PAPERs
(1911) 230, 231.
51 See 2 HAwxINs, PLEAs OF THE CRowN (8th ed. 1824) 116.
52 For the writer's discussion of the r6le of lay organizations, see THaF',
LAW AND SOCIETY (1935) 8o-go, 195--206, 273-76.
53 There were, to be sure, special functionaries who served as a bond between
Crown and people. Thus the early coroner, the justice and the sheriff were con-
servators of the peace with subordinate constables to assist them. Cf. MoRIus, THE
MEoDlxvAL. ENGLISH SHERIF TO 1300 (1927) 228-29. For historical accounts, see
COLQUHouN, A TREATISE ON THE FuNcnoNs AND DurrrS OF A CONSTABLE (1803);
FIELOING, op. cit. supra note 44. But reliance upon and active participation by the
whole population form the essence of the traditional police organization.
" i3 EDW. I, Stat. 2.
55 Cf. "... even before the Conquest the practice of fining a district for the
offences of its inhabitants obtained at least in one part of England... .! The




for the arrest and delivery of strangers to the sheriff; for hue and
cry which the watchmen must levy and follow " with all the Town,
and the Towns near . . . from Town to Town ". For the efficient
prosecution of the underlying plan " every man . . . from fifteen
years and sixty years" must maintain equipment according to his
wealth.
By the seventeenth century (where we began, in Dalton, to
trace the doctrinal development of arrest) this medieval system
was being severely strained. Especially was this the case in all
populous centers. In Middlesex there was constant and wide-
spread effort to escape compulsory service as tithingmen and
watchmen. Teachers, physicians, the poor and the old were usu-
ally excused. The parish constables, being unremunerated, sought
to escape duty just as did those nominated for the watch. Persons
who made no attempt to avoid or transfer their obligation to serve
as peace officers were frequently alehouse keepers who manipu-
lated their public vocation in futherance of their private interest. 6
Protests by grand juries became common." Complaints of brib-
ery and misuse of office by constables nevertheless accumulated.
Dismissal from an office which meant work without pay could pro-
vide no deterrent; it would have been welcomed.
That watch and ward failed to provide adequate protection be-
came increasingly recognized in the course of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Finally, in 1753, at the peak of an unusually acute " crime
wave ", the Duke of Newcastle and Henry Fielding took the first
direct approach to professionalization of police. They organized
the Bow Street Runners. 8 The personnel was composed of the
best thief-takers of the time -remunerated from private funds.
In similar fashion some years later John Fielding, who succeeded
Henry, organized the Horse Patrol to guard the roads. Financial
56 ".. . such persons were wont to take arrested people to their houses, keep
them there till they had spent great sums in eating and drinking and lodging, and
then release them without bringing them before a Justice." DOWDELL, A HUiiND E
YEARS OF QUARTER SESSIONS (1932) 20; see also MEMOIRS OF JA Is BOI.D
(1772) 3-4.
57 See DOWDELL, op. cit. supra note 56, at 20.
58 See FIELDING, AN ACCoUNT OF THE ORIGIN AND EFFECTS OF A POLICE SET ON
FOOT BY HIS GRAmC TE DuxE OF NEWCASTLE IN THE YEAR 1753, UPON A PLAN
PRESENTED TO His GRACE BY THE LATE HENRY FIELDING, ESQ. (1758) xS-6. For an
intimate narrative, see FITZGERALD, CHRONICLES OF BOW STREET POLICE-OFFICE
(1888).
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grants, still privately endowed, continued to mount, and after
1773 they were increased to £iooo annually, distributed by the
Bow Street Magistrate. 0
Events move rapidly in the latter part of the eighteenth century.
Police reform is in the air; numerous suggestions are made, and
by all sorts of persons." In 1792 Parliament passed the Middle-
sex Magistrates Bill,0 which organized the seven offices (three
justices at each) into a closer unit. The duties of the justices were
more clearly defined; fees were eliminated; fixed and liberal re-
muneration was provided; power was granted the justices to em-
ploy constables.2  Improvement was quickly felt. 3
In 1796, Colquhoun, one of these magistrates,"' published his
Police of the Metropolis. He offered a plan for the organization
and distribution of police through the entire city. 5 It was more
specific, more carefully worked out than preceding ones. He dealt
principally with two major defects -personnel and remunera-
tion.6" But reform as regards remuneration meant at that time,
even to the foremost student of the problem, not regular salaries
but special fees, and these contingent upon success."
Investigations of police problems were conducted by parlia-
mentary commissions in 1770, 1793, 1812, i816, i818, 1822, and
1828. The r8r6 Report from the Committee on the Police of the
Metropolis, coming at the very center of the legal development
described above, is a particularly valuable document. We learn
50 The metropolitan magistrates, especially the one at Bow Street, combined
judicial, administrative, and executive duties. Perhaps the activity which distin-
guished them most from our magistrates was their command of the constabulary.
They directed investigations; indeed some of the ablest magistrates themselves par-
ticipated in detective work, sometimes in disguise. They read the Riot Act procla-
mation in person, conducted raids, supervised the work of their forces and carried
on general police activities.
60 E.g., BLizARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS ON POLIcE (1785) 11-12, 57.
61 32 GEO. III, c. 53, made permanent, 42 GEo. III, c. 76 (1802).
62 Forty-two were employed. See LEE, op. cit. supra note 49, at 173.
63 Note the Silk Manufacturers' resolution, quoted by CoQu-nouN, POwCE
OF THE MEfTROPOLIS (1796) 373n.
64 Compare him, Henry Fielding, John Fielding and even the lesser magistrates
of Middlesex with the contemporary magistrates in the police courts of our large
cities !
65 See pp. 226-28.
66 See id. at 228.
67 See id. at 228-29.
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there that each of the seven metropolitan offices was at that time
staffed by a number of paid constables under the supervision of
the magistrates. Attached to Union Hall, for example, were eight
constables, one of whom served as clerk in the police court. The
other seven patrolled a territory not less than " thirty or forty
miles" in circumference, with a population, according to the sta-
tistical returns in i81i, of 127,312 persons-one constable to
i8,187 persons." Each magistral office was a separate, independ-
ent establishment, without knowledge of the others' activities. 9
There was general recommendation of inter-office cobperation.
A similar need prompted insistence upon control of the parish
watchmen and constabulary by the magistrates."
It was agreed that the most effective recent improvement was
the organization of the Horse Patrol in i8o5." Indeed, the testi-
mony showed rapid progress where there was professional service
one notable result being that by the end of the eighteenth and
the beginning of the nineteenth century, there had been a sharp
diminution in crimes of violence."'
Upon the ineptitude, inefficiency, even absurdity of the parish
watchmen all witnesses were agreed.7" The watchman was "gen-
erally an old man . . . dozing in his watch-box in the interval
between crying the hours and when he is moving "." "Offences
[were] committed in the streets, close by a watch-box, and ...
68 See Evance, Magistrate at Union Hall, in THm 1816 REPORT FRom THE Com-
MITTEE ON THE STATE OF THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS, pp. 82-83.
69 . . . the different Police Officers keep their information to themselves, and
do not wish to communicate it to others, that they may have the credit and ad-
vantage of detecting offenders." Gifford, Senior Magistrate of Worship-street, in
id. at 126-27.
70 -... .we have no power for sending for the watchmen, or if we did, we have
no power of punishing him; we recommend that the persons complaining shall go
to the parish Watch Committee ... " Magistrate Raynsford, in id. at 77.
71 See id. at 288.
'72 See id. at 212, 316.
73 " It was a popular amusement amongst young men of the town to imprison
watchmen by upsetting their watchboxes on top of them as they dozed within; and
the young blood who could exhibit to his friends a collection of trophies such as
lanterns, staves, and rattles, was much accounted of in smart society. The news-
papers were never tired of skits at the expense of the parochial watch ". LEE, op. cit.
supra note 49, at 184-85.
74 Conant, Chief Magistrate of Bow Street, in THE x816 REPORT FROM THE
COMMITTEE ON THE POLICE OF T ME TROPOLIS, p. 29.
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the watchman was fast asleep, or would give no assistance. . . ." "
Fully ninety-five per cent of them were old, poor, harmless fellows
employed by householders." Abominably paid, they were easily
bribed.7 7
The police constables, attached to the Official Establishments,
received a guinea a week -insufficient even for bare subsistence
of themselves and their families.7 ' This small public salary had
to be supplemented - and the sources were three: remuneration
by the complaining witnesses, public rewards, and bribes. 9
Payment of fees and expenses by individuals seeking police as-
sistance appears to have been the rule, not the exception."0
A few men of experience and imagination were able to free
themselves of the traditional pattern of "every man a police-
man ", of local service by private individuals. While the judges
grappled with the legal problems, they initiated political reforms.
Lay protective associations, thief takers, magistrates and special
police constables, horse patrols, marshalmen - these marked
stages in a slow development toward a general, professional police.
Yet watch and ward hung on until 1829." So, too, did the loose
string of independent magistracies.
In that year, however, a change occurred of such importance
that it has been generally recognized as introducing the contem-
porary system of professional police. For on April 15, 1829,
Peel introduced the Metropolis Police Improvement Bill. 2 He
"was satisfied, that so long as the present night-watch system was
persisted in, there would be no efficient police prevention of crime,
75 See id. at 77.
76 See Holdsworth, upper marshal of the City of London, in id. at 388.
77 See id. at 27, 218.
78 See id. at 72, 109, 134. In addition, there was no provision whatever to com-
pensate officers who became ill or wounded in the course of duty, or for pensions of
any sort. See id. at 262.
79 See id. at 72.
80 See id. at 5-6.
81 Reliance upon crude measures of self-protection is shown by the use, well
into the nineteenth century, of steel man-traps and spring guns. A bill was intro-
duced in 1825 to limit these to dwelling houses. See 12 HNssARn PARL. DEE. (N.s.)
64X; not until 1827 was it passed. See 7 & 8 GEo. IV, c. 18.
82 As early as X826 Peel had begun to investigate the police problem intensively.
In 1827 (the year of Beckwith v. Philby) there was especially strong agitation in
the press for police reform. Cf. GLovER, THE ENGLisH PoLIcE (1934) 57-58.
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nor any satisfactory protection for property or the person ...
The chief requisites of an efficient police were unity of design and
responsibility of its agents." 8 Each parish was isolated from
the others; there were even independent subdivisions within some
parishes. Every imaginable arrangement existed. The parish of
St. Pancras, for example, had "eighteen different, isolated irre-
sponsible police establishments ". In other parishes there was
no night watch whatever.
Peel proposed to unite parochial authorities under control of a
Board of Police, all to be subject to the direction of the Home Sec-
retary. He would abolish all watch-taxes and substitute a general
police-tax. The Horse Patrol, organized in 1805, having a com-
petent personnel and under unitary control, had been very effec-
tive. "It was upon such principles that he would propose to es-
tablish the patrol contemplated by this bill." 84 Two months later
the Bill passed.85 It marked the culmination of the accelerated
movement for professional police that began in 1753 when the Bow
Street Runners were organized. It initiated the contemporary po-
lice in substantially its present form and organization. The"Bob-
bies "who appeared in 1829 composed a large semi-military force,
centrally controlled, disciplined, paid entirely from public funds,
wholly uniformed and, in the aggregate, an entirely new organiza-
tion. Improvements continued to be made. 6 But they were rela-
tively minor as compared with the sweeping changes Peel effected.
We may terminate the history of the rise of a professional force
at this point.87 It covers the period principally dealt with in the
discussion of the rules of law.8 Before integrating the two divi-
sions of discussion thus far essayed, let us inquire briefly into the
factors that stimulated the above development of legal doctrine
and professional police. If we sought a phrase to epitomize the
83 21 HAsAmU PARL. DEB. (N.s.) 872.
84 Id. at 878.
85 io GEO. IV, c. 44 (June ig, 1829). It was entitled, "An Act for improving
the Police in and near the Metropolis."
86 See FuIJ), POLICE ADImSnsTRATiO (I909) 22-23.
87 For rise of modem police in American cities, cf. COSTELLO, OuR POLICE PRO-
TECTOPS - HISTORY OF TiE NEW YORK POLICE (i885) 102; FoLsoM, OuR POLICE
-A hsToRY oF THE BALTimORE FORCE (1888) 24; CosTELLo, HISTORY OF THE
POLICE DEPARTMET OF JERSEY CITY (1891) 55.
88 See pp. 570-78, supra.
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process characterized by the underlying forces that on the one
hand propelled and on the other opposed the expansion of legal
doctrine and the rise of a professional force, we might designate it
a conflict between Social Need and Political Ideals.
The need for security, protection and order, consequent upon the
Industrial Revolution was great and insistent. Mobility of popu-
lation, urbanization, and the rise of large scale industry, set against
the earlier, rooted, rural organization of society, are the salient
features of the vast social changes that ushered in a modern Eng-
land. The consequent appearance of thief-takers, lay protective
agencies, the practice of rewards, and organization of small spe-
cialized forces mark the earlier, rather spontaneous adaptations
to the new situations.
The major problem of security, stimulating such sporadic at-
tempts at solution, is accentuated in the large cities- and, of
course, most acutely in London. Over a million and a half inhabit-
ants by the dawn of the nineteenth century! A tangle of many
discordant elements; a human hive to be ordered as men seek an
equilibrium that will permit survival and growth.
The phenomenon that most dangerously threatens life and prop-
erty in the metropolis is the Riot; and there were many riots in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.8" In 1715 the Riot Act
extended the powers of the magistrates, and made the offense a
felony without benefit of clergy." The passage of the legislation
showed the need. But it provided no remedy, and indeed, its re-
quirement that the magistrate read the proclamation contained in
the Act to the mob impeded prompt counteraction.
The Gordon Riots of i780 were probably the most serious of
all. Their occurrence at the very beginning of the period of rapid
growth in the law of arrest makes them especially important. The
riots started on June 2, 178o, and lasted six days. The greatest
confusion imaginable ensued. Panic set in as the populace fled
the mad assault and barricaded itself. While the least disorderly
contented themselves with parading, petitioning, and speech-
89 E.g., the riot following the passage of the Gin Act of 1736 (" No Gin, No
King! "), the rebellion in favor of the Young Pretender in 1745, the journeymen
weavers' in 1765, the Wilkes' furor in X768 (" Wilkes and Liberty! "), the Gordon
Riots in 178o, Sir Francis Burdett's disturbance in i8io, and that on the Queen's
funeral in 1821.
90 x GEo. I, Stat. 2, C. 5.
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making, at the other extreme the most irresponsible elements, set
free always in such emergencies, indulged in arson, burglary, theft,
and brutal assaults.9 '
Five hundred rioters besieged the Palace. Thousands formed a
blockade around Parliament. They burnt the houses of judges
and other officials. 2 They stormed Newgate Prison, burnt it, and
released the inmates. So, too, with Fleet Prison and King's Bench
Prison. They plundered the Sessions House and the Old Bailey,
and tried to force an entry into the Bank of England. Members
of Parliament, regarded as directly responsible for the obnoxious
legislation that had removed disabilities from Catholics, were sub-
jected to special abuse. While the Upper House was in session
the mob clamored at the doors.93
Lord Mansfield left the House to return home, shortly to experi-
ence an irreparable and tragic loss. The mob attacked his house.
At the last moment he and his wife escaped through a back pas-
sage. The mob set fire to the place, and before morning little more
remained than the bare walls. Especially unfortunate was the loss
of his library, private letters and writings, the labor and collection
of many years.94
Under the circumstances it is astonishing to note how long the
authorities waited before summoning the army to aid the distressed
magistrates; and to observe the unwillingness of the military offi-
cials to take decisive action except in the last extremity and then
only upon "magistral orders "." Despite this restraint, 285 per-
91 CI. TnE BRISTOL RIOTs, TEEm CAUSES, PROGRESS, AND CONSEQUENCES (2832)
220-22.
92 "' Black Wednesday was the most horrible night I ever beheld, which for
six hours together I expected to end in half the town being reduced to ashes?"
Walpole, quoted by nE CASTRO, THE GORDON RIOTS (2926) 12o. "' I remember the
Excise and the Gin Act, and the rebels at Derby, and Wilkes's interlude, and the
French at Plymouth, or I should have a very bad memory, but I never till last night
saw London and Southwark in flames! '" Id. at I55.
93 " In Lord Thurlow's absence, Lord Mansfield presided in the Upper Chamber,
where, said the Duke of Gloucester to Walpole, 'he quivered on the Woolsack like
an aspen ' in consequence of the ordeal he had experienced." "Lord Mansfield, says
Kenyon, was forced to escape by water in a green coat and bob-wig." Id. at 37-38.
11 See 4 CAmBELL, LIvEs OF T= Ci' JUSTIcES OF ENGLAND (I899) 303
et seq.
95 " Shortly after there marched to the Bishop's door the forty soldiers from the
church. Markham begged the officer to act forthwith, but the ensign in the ab-
sence of a magistrate absolutely refused; the prelate then tried to induce him to act
on the authority of a constable then in the house, offering to indemnify him to any
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sons were killed by guards and light horse, and 173 others were
seriously wounded."8
It is worth emphasis that the soldiers were summoned only after
orders from the King, who first received the Attorney General's
opinion pronouncing the legality of the measure. Subsequently,
this ordering out of the army was severely criticized even in the
Upper House.17 Lord Mansfield rose to the King's defense. One
may believe that his remarks were inspired by firm convictions as
to policy, if not, indeed, by deep emotion. Delivered two months
after Samuel v. Payne, and two and one-half years before Ledwith
v. Catchpole, they will repay examination."
But the immediate effect of the Great Riots, so far as protection
was concerned, was growth in lay organization, not in public police.
Thus Romilly noted that: "'The inhabitants of almost every
parish [were] forming themselves into associations to protect their
houses. . . .' " The urgent need for protection by adequate
police was fully understood. The newspapers made vigorous ap-
peals for reform. But despite the recent terror and the ensuing
agitation, protection continued to be left in private hands.
Manifestly, there must have been very strong forces in operation
to delay reform for half a century. The wave of criticism that
met the King for summoning the army even in a crisis brought on
by riot and criminality reveals the nature of these causes, namely,
deep, uncompromising opposition to the maintenance of a semi-
military professional force in civilian life.
Opposition to such an organization in control of the Executive,
an opposition deeply ingrained and rooted in associations that
grew from an intermittent struggle extending over a long sweep of
centuries - that was the force, irrational and misplaced in this
amount, but the officer persisted in his refusal." Da. CASTRO, op. cit. supra note 92,
at 98-99.
96 See id. at 236.
97 ". . . the Duke of Manchester and a few other peers ... contended that the
employment of the military to quell riots by firing on the people could only be
justified, if at all, by martial law proclaimed under a special exercise of the royal
prerogative." Id. at 204.
98 Quoted in DE CASTRO, op. cit. supra note 92, at 204-07. Gordon was after-
wards indicted and tried before Lord Mansfield. It was a tribute to the English
judiciary in general, and to Lord Mansfield in particular, that neither he nor his
counsel even intimated that a fair trial could not be had before the man who had
sustained such serious personal losses. And, indeed, Gordon was acquitted.
99 Quoted in DE CASTRO, op. cit. supra note 92, at 197.
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instance, perhaps, but potent and enduring none the less, that pre-
vented professionalization of police even after the experience of
I78o. When in 1792 the Middlesex Justices Bill was before the
House, designed, as we have seen, merely to improve the magis-
tracy, not to create any changes in police, Fox, Sheridan, and other
doughty representatives of the prevalent revolutionary ideology
vehemently opposed the measure." 0 Any attempt to strengthen
the Executive was enough to stir the opposition, especially of those
who regarded themselves as the champions of individual liberty.
Every advocate of police reform had to face this issue. And it
is of the greatest importance to know how the conflict was resolved.
What was the necessary solution in the light of such political ideals,
woven ineradicably into a long tradition? Let us see how Colqu-
houn, the earliest and most insistent advocate of improved police,
met the issue. The essence of his argument was that protection
was necessary in order to preserve "the blessings of true liberty
and the undisturbed enjoyment of property." 101
In language eloquent of "natural rights ", fused with the suc-
ceeding ideology of "individual liberty ", were formulated the
lines of the future solution - security and protection as essential
prerequisites to liberty! The dialectics involved are obvious.
More to be noted are the very intimate interplay between dominant
philosophies and social problems, and the translation of pervasive
legal and political ideas and ideals into terms of practical experi-
ence - revealing and facilitating an adjustment demanded by the
impact of many complex forces.
But such adjustment is slow, as measured by the life of indi-
viduals. In this country, at least as regards the problem of police,
we have hardly begun to approach it intelligently. In England the
100 "Was it fit to grant all these powers, and more, to a new description of
magistrates appointed by, and receiving salaries from, the crown? " 29 HAxSARD,
PARLIAMENTARY HisTORY or ENGLAND (1792) 1464-65; cf. id. at 1474.
101 So too: "It cannot be too often or too powerfully inculcated, that Arrange-
ments which have for their object the Security of Innocence and the Prevention of
Crimes, ought by no means ever to be considered as an Infringement of the Liberty
of the Subject; since the effect of the System is in reality to extend, and by no
means to abridge, those Privileges which are secured to every member of the body
politic....
"In restraining and preventing the Commission of Crimes, the natural Rights
of the Innocent become more extended and protected; the security of the unoffend-
ing individual is strengthened, and the general State and Condition of Society is
improved." CoLQuHoum, A TREATiE ON THE COmCE and PoLIcE or TE RIVER-
THAMES (18oo) xix.
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issues raged back and forth many years before they were clearly
understood." 2 When Peel introduced his bill for the improvement
of police, he was careful to anticipate the libertarian argument."0 3
But by 1829, with reaction against the French Revolution in the
ascendancy, opposition in Parliament had entirely disappeared.
Still the public was by no means reconciled to the new measures
even in 1829. Their continued hostility is one aspect of the prob-
lem. 4 The other is the method employed to win popular ap-
proval. In the initial statement of his plans, Peel was quite con-
servative - only a few parishes at a time would be taken over by
the central force. Upon the adoption of the bill, great care was
taken by police officials to avoid friction with the public. 5
But a large section of the press kept up a barrage of invective
hurled at Peel- he planned a coup d'etat, they said; Wellington
to be enthroned; tyranny to supplant English liberty; under the
pretense of providing protection Peel intended to set up an inqui-
sition - these and other now-seeming absurdities filled their
columns.' But the unrestrained public protests that accompanied
such agitation became increasingly confined to the most irresponsi-
ble members of the community. Five years after its organization,
an investigating committee highly approved of the new police.
Careful selection of officers, training, patience, restraint even
in riots and under conditions of danger and violence, the consum-
mate tact of the commissioners, the calling to account of any officer
upon any complaint -these have been the methods used in Eng-
102 Cf. Francis Burdett's resistance to the soldiers sent to arrest him on the
order of Parliament. On his release from the Tower, June i, i8io, an enormous
throng greeted him with unbounded applause as a great hero of the liberties of the
people. Everywhere were streamers and banners, bearing the inscriptions, "Magna
Carta ", "Trial by Jury ", "Hold to the Laws ", etc. See ARmTAGE, HISTORY Or
=H Bow STRmT RuNNERS, p. x66.
103 See 21 HANSARD PARI,. DEB. (N.S.) 88i.
104 Cf. TEmPEST, POLIcE! (1889) 72.
105 , .. 'At the commencement of the new establishment,' say the Commis-
sioners, 'it is the more necessary to take particular care that the constables of the
police do not form false notions of their duties and powers.'" LEE, op. cit. supra:
note 49, at 241.
108 In i83o, just prior to the Royal Procession, anonymous placards were broad-
cast, reading "' Liberty or Death ! Englishmen! Britons !! and Honest Men I I I
The time has at length arrived. All London meets on Tuesday. Come Armed.
We assure you from ocular demonstration that 6ooo cutlasses have been removed
from the Tower, for the use of Peel's Bloody Gang. Remember the cursed Speech
from the Throne!! These damned Police are now to be armed. Englishmen, will
you put up with this ? '" Id. at 251.
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land. They provided the technique for resolving the difficulties
that inhered in the clash of social need with traditional political
ideals. Indeed the "Peeler" or " Bobby" became popular; and
if one reflects for but a moment on the initial wide, virulent
anathematizing of this creation of social necessity, it becomes
clear how well the leaders of police and the formers of opinion
have done their tasks.10 7
Thus in the study of arrest one encounters many political, philo-
sophical, and social movements. Social values are found inextri-
cably interwoven with the law. Any case, stripped in its report to
the very bone of technicality, reflects to some degree - and here
more obviously, perhaps, than elsewhere - a whole sweep of
ideals, sentiments, and social problems which filter through the
specialist's tradition, technique, and language, and give the latter
meaning in the whole fabric of the broader suggested context.
The legal and political developments described above may be
viewed as attempts to cope with pressing social problems. Judge
and political leader sought to achieve necessary adjustments, each
by his own methods. New political organization, doctrinal expan-
sion, and a myriad of forces, propelled especially by representa-
tives and members of a class intent upon both protection and
laissez faire - all were pointed at objectives rather commonly
shared, although by no means always deliberately marked out.
Viewed against this historical background, with the salient de-
velopments chronologically fixed, the broad assertion that a police
officer could without a warrant arrest for felony" at common law"
even though no felony had been committed, becomes at best so
crude and ambiguous as to be totally misleading. One does not
usually think of 1827 as tantamount to "at common law ". And
the position that "at common law" may mean any rule formu-
lated by courts at any time, while defensible technically, sheds no
light upon the social significance of the problem, and indeed tends
rather to confusion of the legal problem as well. Without analysis
of the cases, one familiar with the social and political history, and,
more specifically, with the rise of professional police during the
107 The problems of course persist, as does the debate. For recent sharp criti-
cism of English police, see WRIGHT, PoLicE A N PuLic (1929). And see the writer's
analysis of The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, in a
forthcoming issue of the UNIERsis os CmCAGO LAW RE VIEW.
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period 1753 to 1829 as a phenomenon of peculiar importance when
set against the traditional system, might with reasonable as-
surance look for corresponding growth in legal doctrine only after
the middle of the eighteenth century. From the origin of the Bow
Street Runners to Samuel v. Payne was little more than a quarter
of a century, and in the decision of that case in I 78o a great judge
brought into clearer focus the rudiments of a socially necessary
formula which, in the course of half a century, culminated in the
now familiar rule of law. During this period, 1780 to 1827, five
lines of doctrinal development appear, interlaced, and changing
often and reciprocally." 8 They focus upon: rights existing upon
the commission of a felony; rights following a charge of felony com-
mitted, where none has in fact occurred; the reasonableness of the
charge, and of the officer's suspicions when acting without a charge;
liability of complainants for charges unreasonably made; and the
right of lay persons to arrest for felony.
The courts' varied adaptation of the rules, with a view to main-
taining an equilibrium between increased official power and tra-
ditional political ideals, is apparent. Elimination of the require-
ment to prove commission of a felony is accompanied in the first
instance (Samuel v. Payne, 178o) by insistence upon a charge of
felony. But upon such charge being made, the officer need not
determine its reasonableness. Arrest upon information but felony
in fact committed (Ledwith v. Catchpole, 1783) again extends
official right- but now emphasis is placed upon reasonable sus-
picion. There is a brief period of full protection for officers acting
in reliance upon any charge, reasonable or not (White v. Taylor,
i8oi; M'Cloughan v. Clayton, i816). The courts believe, appar-
ently, that the requirement of a charge should be gotten rid of;
therefore when retaining it, reluctantly, no other limitations should
be added. The same feeling out the way to advance the necessary
instrumentalities, the same balanced swing to and fro between
these goals, continues until i816 when Lord Ellenborough (Isaacs
v. Brand) decides, without amplification, that a charge by a juve-
nile accomplice is not a reasonable one. The type of complainant
suggests the initial step, but no generalization whatever is ventured
from those facts. And, thus, in 1823 (Hedges v. Chapman) with
a respectable complainant, despite the Isaacs case, the charge
need not be a reasonable one. Finally, in 1827 come the two cases
108 See pp. 570-78, supra.
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which set the opposing rules in direct juxtaposition, and clarify
these formulas. There results elimination of the need for any
charge to support arrest without a warrant where no felony was
committed, but also, insistence upon the reasonableness of arrest
under all circumstances, charge or no charge. (February, 1827,
Cowles v. Dunbar; Easter, 1827, Beckwith v. Philby.)
Throughout the entire period from 1780 to 1827 there is relative
certainty in the rules regarding liability of the complainant for an
unreasonable charge. And in recent years we have seen (Walters
v. Smith, 1914) very rigid limitation upon arrest by lay persons:
the very felony for which the arrest is made must have been com-
mitted."°9 Thus, extension of the rights of officers to arrest has
been invariably accompanied by limitation of such rights as re-
gards lay persons. Thus, too, extension of official right has been
accompanied by limitation designed to compel reasonable conduct
within the area enlarged.
I have tried to trace in rather broad outline the development of
the major rules of the law of arrest which form the link between
lay and professional behavior; and to indicate some conjunction
of the lines of doctrinal development and those representing
the growth of a modern professional police force. Underlying
these movements, there have only been suggested the social forces
which set the basic problems. The issues thus drawn persist.
There is revealed the constant, though not always asserted, an-
tagonism between the interest expressed by the Executive's em-
ployment of a trained, armed, professional force, and opposing
political values, expressed as "individual liberty ", or "social
interest in the individual life ". Finally, we have seen how the
English in good measure resolved this conflict -how they met
the increased need for security, and how at the same time by intel-
ligent leadership, insistence on restraint, exercise of restraint, and
skillful propaganda, their police became recognized, not as the
strong arm of the Executive, but rather as the "servant of the




109 The rule in many American jurisdictions is broader. It is sufficient if a
felony has been committed, not necessarily the one for which the arrest was made.
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